

10 April 1987

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18

Defector Details Polish Regime's Perfidy

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WASHINGTON — The Polish government never intended to reach a lasting compromise with the free trade union Solidarity, which the government later crushed, and it started planning martial law even before the end of August 1980 strikes that gave birth to the organization.

Those are among the assertions in the first public statement by a Polish general staff officer who spied for the U.S. for several years before defecting one month before the December 1981 imposition of martial law. In his 55-page interview published this week in the Paris-based Polish-language journal *Kultura*, Lt. Col. Ryszard Kuklinski sheds new light on how Polish and Soviet officials dealt with one of the most serious challenges ever to Soviet-sponsored one-party rule.

The interview paints a portrait of Polish leaders whose long negotiations with Solidarity over matters ranging from its legal status to wage agreements were calculated only to buy time before they found a way of ridding the country of the 10 million-member threat to their rule.

Although it has long been believed in the West that the Soviets were planning to invade Poland at two points during Solidarity's 16-month life, Col. Kuklinski's account provides the first insiders' details confirming this. He speaks of hitherto undisclosed meetings at which Soviet and Polish officials hashed out even the most minor martial law procedures. These included the list of dissidents to be arrested, how many hours ahead of the crackdown they should be picked up (the Soviets said 14, and the Poles settled on six) and what day of the week would be easiest (Sunday).

Col. Kuklinski defected after learning that his colleagues suspected him. He sounded an alarm to a Central Intelligence Agency official who got him out of Poland. Senior officials of that time and intelligence sources say that for several years he provided the U.S. invaluable information on the Warsaw Pact. They consider the *Kultura* interview the most authentic and reliable report yet of the official side of the Solidarity era.

Word of Col. Kuklinski's role surfaced last summer, when Polish spokesman Jerzy Urban told the Washington Post that the colonel had been a CIA spy. Mr. Urban claimed the Reagan administration knew of martial law before it was imposed but nevertheless remained silent.

Col. Kuklinski told *Kultura* he advised against making the plans public, fearing that disclosure could set off a Soviet invasion of Poland following public panic. U.S.

officials have said that they withheld the information for precisely that reason.

However, the Polish colonel's insights raise doubts about the image Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski has tried to portray that his martial law saved his country from a far worse fate. Col. Kuklinski says the Soviets couldn't have invaded without Polish official and military cooperation, and that Gen. Jaruzelski and his predecessor Stanislaw Kania "didn't have enough courage or strength to oppose Soviet blackmail."

"If Kania and Jaruzelski from the very beginning would have said no to the Russians under pressure of open attacks and threats, I am convinced Solidarity would have changed its position and become more willing to compromise and the Soviet Union would have been forced to drop its plans to invade Poland," he said. He cites Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka's refusal to bend to Soviet demands in 1956, despite an invasion threat, as successful resistance of Soviet strong-arming.

His chronology of the Solidarity period provides many answers that journalists of that time could only guess at, making more sense of a critical historical period and more generally illuminating relations between the Soviet Union and its neighbors.

The chronology includes:

—Aug. 22, 1980: The idea of martial law is born. The leadership creates a "party-government management staff," led by Prime Minister Jozef Pinski and including Gen. Jaruzelski, then defense minister. They decide to undermine Solidarity through administrative actions while discussing contingency plans for martial law.

—Oct. 22, 1980: Two days before the application for registration of Solidarity is to be reviewed by a regional court in Warsaw, the Polish army begins planning martial law. Defense Minister Jaruzelski directs the general staff's work.

—November 1980: The Soviet Union expresses dismay to Polish leadership that its slow action is resulting in the spread of Solidarity and the creation of new independent movements. Even as a Warsaw court is giving Solidarity its legal rights, the Soviets finalize plans for invasion and secretly organize a hardline Polish military and party group that would take over after Warsaw Pact troops invade.

Col. Kuklinski, who one former official says often acted as liaison between Soviet and Polish officials, says 15 Soviet divisions, two Czech divisions and one East German division would be involved. Soviet and East German navies would blockade Poland. Gen. Jaruzelski tries to convince the Soviets that Polish forces can still handle the situation. Yet he also insists any Soviet invasion scheme include a symbolic

contingent of Polish troops for "secondary actions."

"Nobody suggested we take the slightest measures to oppose the Soviets," Col. Kuklinski remarks and he adds that Gen. Jaruzelski never disagreed that Solidarity must somehow be crushed.

—Late November and early December: Soviet troops are grouping on Polish borders. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, head of the Warsaw Pact, and the Moscow representative with the Polish army, Afanasyev Shcheglov, present detailed invasion plans to Gen. Jaruzelski.

Gen. Jaruzelski disappears Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, despondent, not even available to closest advisers. On Dec. 3 and 4, President Carter warns the Soviets not to intervene. Gen. Jaruzelski flies to Moscow with detailed martial law plans that Moscow accepts. He says the timing must wait until "the balance of power shifts in favor of the government" and Poles become "exhausted by the tense situation."

—February: Some 45 Polish officials draw up final plans for martial law, which are presented to Soviets March 3. Despite Soviet urgings, Gen. Jaruzelski, now prime minister, says he isn't ready to carry them out. The Soviets begin large-scale maneuvers that could be turned into an invasion.

—March 27: A Soviet delegation led by Marshal Kulikov, decide the martial law plans aren't sufficient. They suggest many changes, including suspension of the constitution and that military commanders be assigned to all local authorities. The Soviets provide detailed ideas on how to find and take control of underground radio and publishing.

More than 100 Soviet officials and 60 to 80 Warsaw Pact staff come in late March to the Soviet base at Legnica to send daily reports back to Moscow and act as "consultants."

—April 3: Mr. Kania, still the party leader, and Gen. Jaruzelski fly to Moscow to meet with Leonid Brezhnev and present their plans. When they return, the maneuvers are ended.

—September: The August Solidarity congress and threats of strikes over Solidarity's access to the mass media bring Gen. Jaruzelski to think action must be taken. He replaces Mr. Kania, who opposes martial law, as general party secretary.

What prompts final action, however, is an ultimatum by Polish hardliners closely associated with Moscow that they will act if Gen. Jaruzelski doesn't. They include then foreign minister Stefan Olzowski, Gen. Eugeniusz Molszyk and Polish ambassador to Moscow Stanislaw Kociolak.

"After receiving the ultimatum, there was no turning back from the imposition of martial law," says Col. Kuklinski.